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NoN-PERFoRMINg LoANS AND EURo AREA BANk LENDINg BEhAVIoUR  
AFTER ThE CRISIS
Non-performing loans (Npls) remain high on the policy agenda in europe. their persistence 
at elevated levels after the financial crisis gave rise to financial stability concerns – including 
possible adverse impacts on financial intermediation. a commonly-held view is that Npls 
impair the credit allocation mechanism. however, the literature has not so far offered a 
theoretical framework to support this view. this paper argues that loan demand and supply 
dynamics may vary over the economic cycle and that banks that are burdened with high 
Npls may discriminate between households and firms in their credit allocation decisions 
in the recovery phase. using a novel bank-level dataset for large euro area banks covering 
the period of the recent economic upswing, we find robust evidence that the stock of 
Npls relative to banks’ shock-absorbing capacity, measured by bank capital, has been a 
significant factor in explaining bank-specific loan origination. the effect is found to be 
more significant for corporate than for household lending. since high Npl stocks do 
indeed appear to impair credit allocation, dedicated policies aimed at bringing Npl stocks 
down are required to avoid adverse impacts on the real economy. our findings support the 
aims of the guidance that the single supervisory mechanism has given to banks on their 
Npl strategies. additionally, the linkages between high Npl stocks and credit flows 
motivate the need for complementary measures to address impediments to Npl resolution, 
such as weaknesses in judicial and insolvency frameworks.
one of the consequences of the global financial crisis, which erupted in 2007, and the 
subsequent euro area sovereign debt crisis was the accumulation of a large stock of non-
performing loans (Npls) across a large swathe of euro area banks. by 2013, some 8% of 
the total amount of loans extended by the euro area banking sector were non-performing. 
the distribution of these Npls was not uniform across countries: peak Npl ratios varied 
from less than 2% in the Nordic region to as much as 50% in greece and cyprus. by 2015, 
elevated Npls were firmly recognised as one of the key macroprudential and supervisory 
policy challenges for the euro area banking sector [see Aiyar et al. (2015) and Grodzicki et 
al. (2015)].
the subsequent policy response, formulated by the european council in July 2017, was 
founded on several pillars: improved supervision; the reform of insolvency and debt 
recovery frameworks; the development of secondary markets for Npls (“distressed 
assets”); and restructuring of the banking industry [see FSC (2017)]. Similar policies were 
advocated by the European Systemic Risk Board [see ESRB (2017)]. Since the 2013 peak, 
the aggregate Npl ratio has slowly decreased, reaching about 4.4% in the second quarter 
of 2018. supported by economic tailwinds – including robust economic expansion and 
accommodative monetary policy – the enhanced focus of supervisors on the need to bring 
Npl stocks down undoubtedly played a role in this.
the case for a public policy response to persistently-elevated Npl stocks was motivated 
by concern over the impact that high Npls might be having on credit supply, and, by 
extension, on macroeconomic performance. as discussed in the reports of the esrb and 
the fsc, high Npls are often associated with inefficient allocation of capital and funding, 
while also distracting scarce bank management resources from the running of lending 
businesses. at the same time, high Npl stocks can be seen as a symptom of balance 
sheet weakness among borrower sectors, especially of non-financial corporates. as the 
empirical evidence available at the time that these reports were finalised was limited, this 
Abstract
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paper attempts to shed some light on the relationship between the lending behaviour of 
individual banks and their asset quality, which could provide further insights regarding the 
policy response to asset quality problems.
for a topic of such current policy importance, the available Npl literature is relatively 
sparse and almost exclusively empirical in nature. in a nutshell, the literature suggests that 
there may be two-way causality between bank asset quality and economic performance. 
there is a large body of evidence which shows that episodes of increases in Npls are 
triggered by macroeconomic shocks. based on data from a large sample of advanced and 
emerging economies, it has been argued that the economic cycle is a key driver of 
aggregate Npl ratios, whilst lending rates, exchange rates and stock prices may also help 
to explain changes in NPLs [see Beck, Jakubik and Piloiu (2013)]. Similar conclusions were 
reached for smaller samples of countries [see Nkusu (2011), and glen and mondragón-
Velez (2011)]. Using regional economic data, a threshold relationship between NPLs and 
economic growth in Italy was uncovered [see Mohaddes, Raissi and Weber (2017)]. In that 
paper, a gdp growth rate of more than 1.2% was found to be consistent with decreases 
in the Npl ratio. this leads to the conclusion that italian economic growth would need to 
be significantly boosted, and structural reforms undertaken, to achieve a durable reduction 
in Npl levels. evidence has also been uncovered that structural rigidities and inefficiencies 
in insolvency frameworks have contributed to slow down the reduction of Npls, explaining 
high cross-country heterogeneity in Npl levels observed across europe [see cerulli et 
al. (2017)].
other studies take a more micro approach, analysing the impact of bank-specific factors 
on Npl build-ups, in particular, bank-specific credit growth [see espinoza and prasad 
(2010), and Garrido, Kopp and Weber (2016)]. For Greek banks, it appears that low 
management quality – proxied by cost inefficiencies and weak profitability – contributes to 
poor asset quality of individual banks [see Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas (2012)]. They 
interpret this relationship as evidence that poorly managed banks cannot discriminate 
between sound and unsound borrowers, and, more broadly, cannot manage credit risk 
well. on the other hand, financially weak banks may face incentives to “gamble for 
recovery”, that is, knowing that their likelihood of survival is low, they might lend to 
financially unsound borrowers in the hope that an unexpected positive economic shock 
results in their loans being repaid. some empirical evidence in favour of this hypothesis 
has been found [see Keeton and Morris (1987), and Jimenez and Saurina (2006)].
only a few papers analyse the macroeconomic consequences of elevated Npl stocks and 
the associated debt overhang, or the interaction between policy responses to Npl 
increases and economic performance. the usual transmission channel is related to credit 
supply, which, arguably, may be negatively affected in the presence of high Npl stocks. in 
turn, lower credit supply leads to weaker credit and gdp growth. it has been argued that 
the literature has not so far offered a theoretical framework to support the view that high 
NPLs can limit banks’ lending ability [see Angelini (2018)]. While the theoretical literature is 
indeed sparse, the existence of a relationship between credit supply and Npls in a var 
framework has been variously supported [see Nkusu (2011), espinoza and prasad (2010), 
and Klein (2013)]. Using a large panel of countries, it has been shown that those countries 
which actively reduced their Npls managed to achieve stronger macroeconomic 
performances than countries which did not reduce their Npls [see balgova, Nies and 
Plekhanov (2016)]. An extension of that study found that active resolution of NPLs, for 
example using asset management companies and publicly-funded bank recapitalisation, 
2 Literature Review
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can boost gdp growth by up to 1.5 percentage points annually, in comparison to countries 
where high Npls were not actively dealt with [see balgova, plekhanov and skrzypinska 
(2018)]. On the other hand, it has been argued, on the basis of Italian borrower-level data, 
that only unexpected increases in Npls have affected credit growth [see accornero et al. 
(2017)]. To the extent that NPL build-ups are associated with weak fundamentals of the 
population of borrowers (i.e. negative credit demand shocks) and weak bank capitalisation, 
it is claimed to have no additional effect on credit growth.
most of the literature which considers the consequences of high Npl stocks is focused on 
aggregate data. this paper harnesses bank-level data for a range of euro area countries 
which are part of the single supervisory mechanism of the european union. We investigate 
whether, within the same banking system, banks that differ in terms of their Npl ratios also 
differ in their volume of credit provision. We contend that this approach controls for credit 
demand effects, which are, by and large, common to all banks (that is, barring regional and 
business model variation). We contend that the presence of weak banks may adversely 
affect the total flow of credit and, thus, macroeconomic performance.
in the absence of a theoretical framework for the dynamic relationship between bank 
lending and Npls, this paper aims to present a tentative theoretical foundation for the role 
that Npls may play in the origination of credit, testing it with preliminary empirical evidence. 
a key element of that is distinguishing relevant phases in the Npl cycle, the periods when 
Npls are building-up, when they stabilise and are being reduced.
a key step in answering questions concerning the role of Npls in credit allocation is to 
understand the factors underlying credit demand and credit supply. empirically, 
disentangling these factors is not straightforward [see, for example, del giovane et 
al. (2011), and Hempell and Kok Sørensen (2010)]. As illustrated in Chart 1, in a demand 
and supply context, loan supply, at a given lending rate, is impacted by banks’ costs of 
3  Theoretical 
Considerations
3.1 demaNd aNd supply
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on Aoki et al. (2009).
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funding and their capital buffers; demand, at a given lending rate, is affected by 
macroeconomic variables impacting loan demand [see Aoki et al. (2009)].
in a static context, a rudimentary analysis highlights the role that Npls may play in loan 
supply. for a given bank, an adverse shock (e.g. an unexpected macroeconomic downturn), 
which results in an increase of Npl stocks, depletes capital buffers and, ceteris paribus, 
results in a higher cost of funding, leading to a reduction of loan supply. the same shock 
will also adversely impact loan demand.
distinguishing the effects on stocks and flows is also important in this context. in the 
absence of new lending, the stock of outstanding loans falls, as loans mature. the 
outstanding stock only remains unchanged, so long as new lending replenishes maturing 
loans. empirically, therefore, the impact of Npl stocks on lending may be better observed 
through new lending flows than changes in the stock of loans.
in this rudimentary framework, it is clear that a potential link between Npls and credit 
supply could emerge. but a further aspect of loan demand may be overlooked in such 
analysis. assuming that banks only lend to solvent borrowers, the aggregate demand for 
new credit must decrease, all else being equal, and assuming that the system is closed: 
fewer solvent firms maintaining a given level of individual credit demand result in an overall 
lower aggregate demand. With falling demand, loan volume must decrease as well. from 
this perspective, it is difficult to argue that a stock of Npls does not reduce lending.
it could be postulated that unimpaired borrowers could absorb the excess credit – and as 
such, loan volume does not shrink – and while such an effect may be present, one would 
not expect solvent borrowers to continue to increase demand to fully offset the 
disappearance of demand of insolvent borrowers, for all levels of impairment in an 
economy. this could be thought of as an “accounting identity”, linking Npls to credit 
origination.
on the other hand, banks are obliged to actively monitor and manage credit risk in their 
loan books. as part of risk management, they periodically re-estimate their internal credit 
risk models. following a surge of Npls, the probabilities of default provided by these 
models would increase; if bank risk appetite remains constant, fewer performing borrowers 
would be considered creditworthy. this would “move the goalposts” for borrowers, and 
result in a tightening of loan supply, even for those that are considered solvent.
perhaps what is missing from the static analysis presented previously, and which may 
impact empirical analysis, is a dynamic component that recognises the feedback loops 
that emerge as the economic and financial cycle turns down with Npls rising, and then 
plateauing, before ultimately declining. consider the following “cycle” analysis.
We commence with a closed banking system with equilibrium in the market for loans, and 
a known, small stock of Npls across all banks (chart 2). there is an equilibrium lending 
rate, in aggregate, for the economy, and an equilibrium stock of outstanding loans, where 
loans maturing are replaced by new credit flows.
commencing from this equilibrium, consider the impact of an adverse macroeconomic 
shock which, for banks, raises the prospect of increasing losses on the outstanding stock 
of loans, as households and firms adjust to the shock. concurrently, the loan supply curve 
will shift to the left, as banks reduce loan supply in the face of stresses to their capital 
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buffers and, perhaps, also their cost of funding; while the demand curve for loans will also 
shift to the left, as households and firms demand less credit, in light of reduced consumption 
and investment (chart 3). this has the effect of decreasing the flow of new lending, and 
also the outstanding stock of loans, whilst the effect on lending rates would be ambiguous.
in the second phase, the impact of the macroeconomic shock has been absorbed, a 
cyclical recovery has set in, and Npl stocks have stabilised at an elevated level. in such 
circumstances, loan supply may recover, shifting to the right (chart 4). this may result from 
some “strong” banks being relatively unconstrained by their capital buffers and costs of 
funding, given the perception that their balance sheets are strong and that expectations 
concerning credit risk and future losses remain contained. “Weak” banks on the other 
hand may continue to face lending constraints. the same too may be said of households 
and firms. on the demand side, unimpaired households and firms may no longer be 
adversely affected by negative economic sentiment, and may increase consumption and 
investment. on the other hand, impaired households and firms will remain unable to 
access credit and the market will have shrunk from its original size. assuming the 
“accounting identity” approach holds, banks will supply less credit, as there is less demand 
from solvent borrowers. of course, this may also lead to solvent households and firms 
being denied access to credit, if they are clients of “weak” banks. as such, from phase one 
to phase two, the market for new lending has shrunk as newly-impaired borrowers and 
“weak” banks are no longer active. credit growth in this recovery phase may be impeded 
by “weak” banks, those with high Npls. the combined effect of these forces on demand 
will depend, inter alia, on the relative proportion of impaired to unimpaired borrowers. so 
at the very minimum, credit will contract on a scale equivalent to the fall in demand, but 
possibly by more, if weak banks constrain credit to solvent borrowers.
taken together, and given that it takes time to transit from one phase to the next, it may 
suggest that the relationship between new lending and Npl stocks varies over time. time 
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
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variance in the relationship between variables and heterogeneity across countries in terms 
of the timing of shocks may further complicate the matter. in fact, as the effects of a given 
shock may impact different sectors of the economy differently over time, it may even be 
the case that it is first seen in specific asset classes, before becoming more widespread, 
and therefore, first impacting those banks with higher exposures to those asset classes.
empirically, the dynamics just described present some interesting challenges. in the first 
phase, following a macroeconomic shock which reduces both demand and supply and 
triggers a build-up of Npls, Npl stocks should not explain reduced lending. on the one 
hand, reduced demand will play a role, while on the other, expectations for future bank 
losses and other uncertainties may impact supply. including, therefore, this build-up phase 
of Npls in empirical analysis may lead to inconsistent findings. Npl stock and flow 
dynamics may be a consequence, but not a cause, of changes in the demand and supply 
of loans. 
in the second phase, when stocks of Npls have built-up, but new flows have largely 
stabilised or decreased, a multiplicity of supply and demand factors will be at play, again 
making empirical investigation at the aggregate level challenging. lending supply may 
increase overall, relative to the build-up phase, as strong banks resume lending while 
weak banks would be held back by their balance sheet and risk appetite constraints, but 
it is not clear what result the various forces impacting demand may have. it could be that 
demand also recovers somewhat, or that the effects of the shrinking market reduces 
credit demand further. the composition and condition of bank, firm and household 
balance sheets will condition the outcome.
despite these challenges, it should nevertheless be possible to find a relationship between 
Npl stocks and flows of new lending through the supply channel in disaggregated, bank-
level data, as “strong” banks by definition will have relatively smaller Npl stocks. While it 
3.2  empirical implicatioNs
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
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may not be possible to disentangle the affects, high Npls may also explain reduced 
demand – a high Npl bank has, by definition, a higher number of impaired clients, and is, 
therefore, more affected by the decreased demand of those clients. that concern should 
be mitigated by focusing the analysis on large banks which operate nation-wide or even in 
a cross-border environment, and across several industries. on the other hand, the focus 
on such banks may blur the relationship, for example where cross-border banks 
accumulated Npls outside of the euro area and they may not consider them as a constraint 
in lending to euro area customers. 
our empirical analysis harnesses a novel dataset, the core of which utilises the ecb’s 
supervisory data for significant banks in the euro area.1,2 the data are collected in the 
framework of statutory reporting requirements that all banks domiciled in the european 
union must fulfil, and are subject to a harmonised quality assurance process. this quarterly 
dataset covers the period Q4 2014 to Q2 2018, which coincides with the broad-based 
recovery of the euro area economic activity and the decline in the aggregate Npl ratio. on 
average, it includes 65 significant banks over this period on a consolidated level which 
account for about 78% of the euro area bank assets.3 table 1 provides an overview of the 
data coverage across 14 euro area countries, including the frequency, or observations per 
country, the number of banks captured in the sample, the total assets of those banks as a 
1 see https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/statistics/html/index.en.html.
2 a significant bank is a bank directly supervised by the european central bank in the framework of the single 
supervisory mechanism. significant banks are identified based on criteria laid down in the applicable legislation: 
(i) total assets above €30 billion, or (ii) total assets above 20% of GDP of the country of establishment, or (iii) total 
assets above €5 billion and the ratio of its cross-border assets/liabilities in more than one other participating 
member state to its total assets/liabilities is above 20%, or (iv) the bank is one of the three largest banks in its 
country of establishment.
3 the cross-section is not fixed over the period as the banks subject to direct supervision by the ecb are subject 
to change each year. for further details, see, for example: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/
list/who/html/index.en.html.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1  data aNd related 
coNsideratioNs
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
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ratio of all euro area assets, and their Npl ratio, as a percentage of total loans. the table 
also shows the dispersion of Npl rates across the euro area, from a low of 1.36% of total 
loans in finland, to more than 43% in greece. With the focus on large banks, a question 
of representativeness arises, as the large banks may be better equipped to handle high 
stocks of Npls and maintain loan supply than smaller banks. While it is difficult to fully 
overcome this limitation of the dataset, we control for bank size in the regression analysis.
for reasons of their business model a number of banks in the dataset may be better 
excluded. We focus on banks which engage in lending to the private non-financial sector 
on a substantial scale, which we define to mean that loans to that sector exceed 10% of a 
bank’s total assets. other banks are also removed from the sample. for instance, one 
which is undergoing a long-term wind-down process and several government-sponsored 
development banks are also excluded. this is because most of their lending business is 
tightly regulated, often subject to quantitative limits and limits on pricing, and the 
associated credit risk is often transferred to the government, for example through 
guarantee schemes. Npls are usually very low or non-existent, owing to such structural 
considerations. after exclusion of the affected banks, the sample is reduced from about 
120 to an average of 65 financial institutions per period.
We combine this sample with the individual monetary and financial institutions’ (mfi) 
balance sheet statistics, collected by the ecb for monetary policy purposes. these 
individual mfi data are available for a selection of euro area banks, on a sub-consolidated 
level. often, one consolidated banking group operates via several mfi subsidiaries 
which may be active in different countries. We aggregate the individual mfi observations 
to the level of consolidated banking groups in order to obtain the corresponding data 
NOTES: Total euro area assets refer to total assets of all significant institutions supervised by the SSM, excluding custodian banks and public sector lenders for Q1 
2018; country average for Q1 2018.
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Total assets 
(% of total euro area assets1)
NPL ratio
(% of total loans)
6.30.2618airtsuA
5.28.1282muigleB
4.19.0202dnalniF
5.28.728801ecnarF
6.13.3131651ynamreG
5.340.1465eceerG
7.215.0363dnalerI
1.114.89911ylatI
7.40.0141ainauhtiL
4.31.0282atlaM
3.29.7324sdnalrehteN
2.619.0324lagutroP
8.41.0242ainevolS
0.42.3111451niapS
1.38.7796809aera oruE
DATA DESCRIPTION TABLE 1
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 35
on new lending flows.4 this aggregation procedure leads to a result which, by definition, 
cannot be fully consistent with consolidated data. While the data sources do not allow 
for the calculation of Npl ratios at a more granular, sub-consolidated level, which would 
be consistent with the data on lending flows, it was checked where the Npls held by 
banks represented in the dataset were originated, and found that – depending on the 
time period – only about 10 to 15% of Npls reflected exposures to non-euro area 
customers and in no case did non-domestic Npls represent the majority of total Npls. 
in practice, therefore, the loan flows and the Npl ratio are computed on the basis of a 
broadly aligned geographical perimeter.
While the time dimension for this dataset may appear short, there are some advantages of 
its limited time-span. first, given our focus on Npls, the data reported throughout this 
period relies on the ecb’s implementation of the european banking authority’s harmonised 
definition of Npls.5 this provides much-needed consistency across banks and countries. 
earlier data reporting by banks suffers from heterogeneity in the definition of Npls.
second, we know that the build-up phase of Npls largely preceded 2014, our dataset 
arguably excludes the Npl build-up phase, which is desirable. however, in light of the 
balance sheet-bolstering activities, it is likely that data for 2014 and 2015 could prove 
unreliable, as banks’ lending decisions – especially the weakest ones which failed the 
comprehensive assessment – may have been influenced less by their capital buffers and 
costs of funds, and more by their need to take the remedial action specified by the 
comprehensive assessment.6 as the stocks of Npls also stabilised in 2014 and declined 
only slowly in 2015, it may be argued that, from the cyclical perspective discussed earlier 
in section 3, this period may still belong to the first phase that precedes a partial recovery in 
credit supply. the empirical analysis is therefore performed separately for the full sample 
(2014-2018) and a reduced sample, starting in Q1 2016.
a rudimentary review of the data provides some indication that Npls impact credit 
origination. Charts 5 and 6 show a direct correlation between lending growth and NPL 
rates. chart 5 displays the distribution of average new corporate and household lending 
across Npl ratio deciles for the full sample period on the left, while the distribution per 
Npl ratio decile of the changes in the stock of corporate and household lending is shown 
on the right-hand-side. the same exercise is conducted for a reduced sample period 
which omits the post-comprehensive assessment period (2016-2018) in chart 6. While 
that relationship is not monotonous and may be affected by bank and country-specific 
factors, only the group of banks with an Npl ratio below the 60th percentile of the sample 
– which corresponds to about 5% – have a positive mean lending growth rate. New lending 
is also negatively correlated with the Npl ratio.
4 these data include genuine new lending as well as refinancings and renegotiations of existing loans. although 
not ideal, no better proxy for new lending is currently available. 
5 for further details, see: https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/449824/eba-its-2013-03+final+draft+its
+on+forbearance+and+Non-performing+exposures.pdf.
6 the sample period covers data reported after the ecb’s 2014 comprehensive assessment – the asset quality 
review and stress test which was conducted on all banks in advance of their direct supervision by the ecb when 
it assumed its supervisory responsibilities. two possible impacts could be seen in banking data around this time. 
in the months before and after the comprehensive assessment, there was likely to have been dispersion in the 
quality and consistency of banking data across the euro area, which the exercise significantly reduced. perhaps 
more importantly, in the period before the comprehensive assessment, many euro area banks underwent a 
period of deleveraging and capital-building, in anticipation of the exercise and with a view to front-loading any 
possible requirements stemming from it: “… significant banking groups in the euro area have bolstered their 
balance sheets by over €95 billion through equity issuance” and by the second quarter of 2014 “euro area 
monetary financial institutions… have reduced total assets by €4.3 trillion since peaking in may 2012” [see ecb 
(2014)].
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to explore the role of Npls in credit dynamics, and to harness the novel dataset, a range 
of panel data techniques is employed. this approach builds on the specification proposed 
in the literature [see Bending et al. (2014)], although, providing additional insights into the 
robustness of the results due to the use of two different dependent variables and a broader 
range of bank-specific controls. In contrast with Bending et al.  (2014), the NPL variable 
here is defined as the gross volume of Npls over tier 1 capital, with a view to normalising 
the Npl stock by the available loss absorption capacity.7
the first dependent variable used in the specification is a measure of the quarterly change 
in lending to non-financial corporates or to households. as that variable may be affected 
by changes that are not directly related to provision of new credit – such as loan sales, or 
mergers and acquisitions – an alternative dependent variable is defined as the quarterly 
sum of all new loans to, respectively, non-financial corporations and households, 
normalised by the total stock of such loans.8 table 2 provides details of the variables 
employed and their respective definitions.
7 the Npl stock is related mainly to lending to non-financial corporates and households. We do not distinguish 
between cases where high Npls are related to corporate or to household lending, as both kinds of Npls may 
serve as a constraint on new lending.
8 Quarterly corporate lending flows show pronounced seasonal fluctuations, being higher in the second and the 
fourth quarter of the year, and lower in the first and third quarter. seasonal dummies are included in regressions 
with this dependent variable to correct for seasonal effects.
4.2 specificatioN
NOTE: Buckets are defined as deciles of the NPL ratio over the full sample of banks and time periods.
LENDING GROWTH BY NPL “BUCKET”, 2014-2018
LHS: Quarterly flow of new lending (percentage of stocks), RHS: Quarterly growth rate of loans (percentages)
CHART 5
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the rationale for using non-financial corporate and household lending as a separate 
dependent variable stems from the demand and supply considerations outlined in the 
previous section. it is postulated that banks may differentiate lending decisions, and in 
particular, their decisions to deny applications for credit, amongst different borrower 
classes. a bank’s credit assessment may be more bespoke in the case of loans to non-
financial corporations, which may require diligent financial analysis, than in the case of 
granular household loans, for which lending decisions are often supported by statistical 
tools. restricting credit supply to households may then take place through price terms 
rather than the rejection of credit applications. empirically, therefore, changes in loans to 
non-financial corporates may be more sensitive to any bank credit supply constraint. if 
households are willing and able to absorb the increased cost of lending imposed by banks, 
the pass-through of credit supply limitations will only be partially effective. this will not be 
true for lending to firms.
the fixed/random-effects specification is:
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the specification for the dynamic panel model is:
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NOTE: Buckets are defined as deciles of the NPL ratio over the full sample of banks and time periods.
LENDING GROWTH BY NPL “BUCKET”, 2016-2018
LHS: Quarterly flow of new lending (percentage of stocks), RHS: Quarterly growth rate of loans (percentages)
CHART 6
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where Δli,t is the dependent variable which, depending on the specification, measures the 
quarterly growth rate of loans or the quarterly flow of new lending, by bank i in time t; 
NPL
Tier i t1  , is the ratio of total NPLs to Tier 1 capital for bank i in tine t; b, c and s are 
vectors of bank, country-specific variables, and seasonal dummies, respectively; and ui,t 
are bank-specific fixed effects. the bank-specific vector of variables b comprises measures 
of bank size (total assets), capitalisation (Tier  1 capital or leverage ratio) and funding 
structure (loan-to-deposit ratio or liquidity coverage ratio).9 the country-specific vector of 
variables c comprises measures of economic output (gdp growth) and short- and long-
term interest rates (eoNia rate and the spread between yield on 10-year sovereign bonds 
and eoNia, respectively).10 seasonal dummy variables for the second and fourth quarter 
of each year are included in the vector s.
Where used, the bank-specific variables are intended to control for the impact of potential 
capital or liquidity constraints that a bank may face when lending. in particular, low risk-
weighted capital ratios and higher leverage could be associated with weaker credit 
expansion. highly leveraged banks may constrain lending more than those with lower 
 9 Note that not all of these variables are used in all estimations.
10 loan supply may also be affected by structural factors, such as quality of institutions and the degree of 
protection of creditor rights.
ecruoSnoitinifeDeman elbairaV
Dependent variables
    New corporate/household 
    lending
Quarterly flow of new lending to non-financial 
corporates/households, percentages
ECB supervisory statistics
    Growth in corporate / 
    household loan stock
Quarterly growth rate of loans to non-financial 
corporates/households, percentages
ECB supervisory statistics
Independent variables
    NPL / Capital Ratio of total NPLs to Tier1 capital 
at end-quarter, percentages
ECB supervisory statistics
scitsitats yrosivrepus BCEmhtiragol ,orue ,retrauq-dne ta stessa latoTstessA    
     Tier1 ratio Tier 1 capital ratio at end-quarter, percentages ECB supervisory statistics
     L-t-D ratio Ratio of total loans to total deposits 
at end-quarter, percentages ECB supervisory statistics
 ten / reffub ytidiuqil( oitar egarevoc ytidiuqiLRCL     
liquidity outflow) at end-quarter, percentages
ECB supervisory statistics
 tekram yenom egarevA xednI thginrevO oruEAINOE     
interest rate, average during the quarter, 
percentages
ECB statistical data 
warehouse
    Yield slope Spread between yield on 10-year sovereign 
bonds and EONIA, average during the quarter, 
percentages
ECB statistical data 
warehouse
 emoh s’knab eht fo PDG laer fo etar htworGPDG    
country, percentages
ECB statistical data 
warehouse
    Recovery rate Recovery of debt in insolvency, calculated 
based on the time, cost and outcome of 
insolvency proceedings in each economy
World Bank doing 
business report
    Resolving insolvency Time, cost, outcome and recovery rate for a 
commercial insolvency and the strength of the 
legal framework for insolvency
World Bank doing 
business report
    Q2 dummy / Q4 dummy Seasonal dummy for second/fourth quarter
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS TABLE 2
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leverage, owing to capital constraints. on a similar note, a weak liquidity position, measured 
through a high loan-to-deposit ratio or a low liquidity coverage ratio, could restrain a bank 
from expanding its lending business. it can be hypothesised, for example, that banks with 
a lower proportion of deposit funding may be more sensitive to market conditions and 
perceptions of risk impacting their cost of funding, and could, therefore, lend less than 
banks with a higher proportion of deposit funding. country-specific controls are intended 
to reflect the differences in macroeconomic conditions that may influence both loan 
demand and supply.
standard fixed effects and random effects panel data methods are used to estimate 
the proposed model. in addition, to ensure robustness of the results to any potential 
autoregressive effects in the data, a difference generalized method-of-moments 
estimator is used [see Arellano and Bond (1991)]. This approach is frequently used for 
dynamic panel data regression as it allows for unbiased estimations with short time 
periods and many individuals. hence, it includes a dynamic independent variable, 
depending on its own lagged values, and independent variables that are not strictly 
exogenous but might be correlated with past and current realizations [see roodman 
(2009)]. The Arellano-Bond estimator uses transformations of the endogenous 
variables via differencing and then applies a generalized method-of-moments (gmm), 
which in this case is preferred over system GMM [see Blundell and Bond (1998)], as 
the latter adds more instruments by introducing an additional level equation and, 
therefore, poses the threat of over-identification of the endogenous variables [see 
Roodman (2008)].
in order to maintain consistency of the estimators it is essential to test for serial correlation 
of the instrumental variables, using, for example, the sargan and the hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions as well as a difference-in-hansen test for validity of instruments 
[see Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982)].
reducing the time dimension of the sample to 2016-2018 may be unproblematic from an 
econometric perspective, as the remaining number of observations is large in comparison 
with the total number of instruments used in the gmm estimation. given the cross-
sectional dimension, small values of t are considered sufficiently large [see arellano and 
Bond (1991)].
as a first step, empirical results for the full sample period 2014-2018 were estimated, using 
the fixed effects, random effects, and difference-gmm approach. it should be noted that 
this data sample period coincides with the second phase introduced in section 3.2, where 
stocks of Npls have already built-up, but new flows have largely stabilised or decreased. 
the specification outlined previously was estimated, along with variants that included or 
excluded bank- and country-specific variables. in the dynamic specification, all of the 
right-hand-side variables were included as possible instrumental variables, with lag 
lengths constrained to a maximum of 2, to limit the number of instruments. difference-in-
hansen tests of exogeneity of the instruments suggest that endogeneity is well-controlled 
for [see Hansen (1982)]. Sargan and Hausman specification test statistics indicate 
robustness of the estimators.
the results, outlined in table 3, show that, effectively, the only bank-specific variable that 
is consistently related to the lending growth is the ratio of the Npl stock to capital. as 
expected, the sign of that relationship is negative; the estimated coefficients are higher for 
corporate lending than for lending to households (table 4). all other things being equal, an 
4.3  methodological 
approach
4.4 results
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increase in the stock of Npls by 1% of capital11 would reduce the quarterly flow of new 
corporate lending by between 0.0025% and 0.0048%12 of total loans (see columns 1 to 3 
of table 3). the quarterly growth rate of corporate loans (i.e. the change in the stock of 
loans) would deviate downwards by about 0.010 to 0.013 percentage points in the event 
of an increase in the Npl stock by 1% of capital (see columns 4 to 6 of table 3). for loans 
11 an increase in the Npl stock by 1% of capital would correspond to an absolute increase by slightly over eur 
10 billion, which is rather small in comparison with the total stock of Npls held by significant institutions in the 
euro area, which amounted to eur 722 billion (69% of common equity tier 1 capital) at the end of June 2018, 
down from eur 988 billion (96% of cet1 capital) at mid-2015. it should also be noted that the growth rates in 
loans are calculated over a horizon of one quarter. for annual growth rates, the effects would be about four 
times higher than those reported here.
12 to put this into perspective, the total stock of outstanding corporate loans in the euro area stood at about eur 
4.4 trilion at end-september 2018. the estimated impact would be equivalent to a reduction in the flow of new 
corporate loans by between 110 and 211 million euro per quarter.
NOTES: Columns (1)-(6) refer to different specifications of the estimation: (1) regresses new corporate lending per period on NPL/capital, the log of total assets, GDP, 
EONIA, the yield slope and seasonal dummies in a random effects (RE) model with robust standard errors and a constant, (2) is the same specification for a fixed 
effects (FE) model with robust standard errors and a constant, (3) extends the independent variables by a lag of new corporate lending and applies the difference 
generalized method-of-moments estimator (AB) [see Arellano and Bond (1991)]. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the estimations using period-by-period growth of the stock 
in corporate lending as the independent variable. T-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parenthesis. R-squared and p-values obtained in Hansen/Sargan 
tests of overidentifying restrictions and Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instruments are displayed below the estimation outcome. *** = significance at the 
0.1% level, ** = significance at the 1% level, * = significance at the 5% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE FE AB RE FE AB
***3310.0-**4010.0-***3010.0-**5200.0-***8300.0-**8400.0-latipac/LPN
(-2.96) (-4.73) (-2.73) (-13.24) (-2.89) (-4.15)
*092.44*017.51043.0531.0116.2-045.0-stessA
(-1.00) (-1.24) (0.05) (1.64) (2.18) (2.44)
50-E56.460-E32.970-E62.170-E10.6-50-E71.260-E75.2PDG
(0.75) (1.90) (-0.02) (0.13) (0.53) (1.71)
371.1-500.1049.1680.5*652.6874.4AINOE
(1.62) (2.06) (1.64) (1.02) (0.33) (-0.27)
544.0667.0-390.0720.0280.0-012.0-epols dleiY
(-1.48) (-0.51) (0.09) (0.66) (-1.70) (0.83)
***456.1***612.1***323.1ymmud 2Q
(5.24) (5.19) (3.32)
*711.1453.1*975.1ymmud 4Q
(2.22) (1.94) (2.04)
020.0-gnidnel .proc weN .L
(-1.96)
L. Growth in corp loans -0.076
(-1.35)
*085.37-670.0001.51***048.11tnatsnoC
)60.2-()50.0()94.1()13.4(
157988988957798798snoitavresbO
340.0210.0130.0720.0derauqs-R
164.0410.0tset nesnaH
920.0000.0tset nagraS
164.0490.0nesnaH-ni-ecnereffiD
kcots naol etaroproc ni htworGgnidnel etaroproc weN
EMPIRICAL RESULT FOR THE FULL SAMPLE OF DATA, CORPORATE LENDING TABLE 3
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to households, these relationships are somewhat weaker, as indicated by lower coefficients 
for the Npl/capital variable in table 4, compared to those for corporate lending in table 3. 
the size of a bank is also statistically significant in some regressions.
these results are consistent with the hypothesis presented in section 3 that, at least 
during economic recoveries when credit demand has recovered, high stocks of Npls 
would weigh on bank credit supply. once again, these results are consistent across the 
specifications used, regardless of the country and/or bank-specific variables considered. 
interestingly, these results differ substantially from those previously found using a similar 
specification [see Bending et al. (2014)]. In that case, almost all explanatory variables were 
found to have statistically significant coefficient estimates. that dataset was substantially 
smaller in cross-section, however, than that employed here, with just 42 banks, and 
covered a much longer period, from 2004 to 2013, which arguably includes a period of 
Npl build-up, and more generally, a period of crisis for the euro area.
NOTES: Columns (1)-(6) refer to different specifications of the estimation: (1) regresses new household lending per period on NPL/capital, the log of total assets, 
GDP, EONIA, the yield slope and seasonal dummies in a random effects (RE) model with robust standard errors and a constant, (2) is the same specification for a 
fixed effects (FE) model with robust standard errors and a constant, (3) extends the independent variables by a lag of new corporate lending and applies the 
difference generalized method-of-moments estimator (AB) [see Arellano and Bond (1991)]. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the estimations using period-by-period growth of 
the stock in household lending as the independent variable. T-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parenthesis. R-squared and p-values obtained in 
Hansen/Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions and Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instruments are displayed below the estimation outcome. 
*** = significance at the 0.1% level, ** = significance at the 1% level, * = significance at the 5% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE FE AB RE FE AB
**9400.0-8700.0-*8700.0-3000.00200.0-0300.0-latipac/LPN
(-1.35) (-1.20) (0.70) (-2.09) (-1.30) (-2.63)
***056.19*040.42423.0-916.0-006.1*645.0-stessA
(-2.08) (0.22) (-0.28) (-0.56) (2.13) (3.41)
50-E12.2-40-E15.1-60-E67.160-E67.650-E81.2-*60-E00.3PDG
(2.24) (-1.11) (0.64) (0.37) (-1.12) (-0.23)
760.3-032.5-012.11983.4714.2239.4AINOE
(1.36) (1.01) (1.38) (0.90) (-1.06) (-0.34)
731.1-965.0-621.0-575.0-601.0-022.0-epols dleiY
(-1.72) (-0.43) (-0.71) (-0.64) (-1.24) (-1.10)
661.0-960.0050.0-ymmud 2Q
(-0.18) (0.26) (-0.38)
269.0-102.0-405.0-ymmud 4Q
(-1.41) (-0.56) (-1.16)
791.0gnidnel hh weN .L
(0.88)
L. Growth in hh loans -0.021
(-0.79)
019.95-478.5753.4**160.7tnatsnoC
)27.1-()11.1()51.0()30.3(
157988988957798798snoitavresbO
910.0200.0910.0210.0derauqs-R
613.0100.0tset nesnaH
402.0000.0tset nagraS
914.0300.0nesnaH-ni-ecnereffiD
kcots naol dlohesuoh ni htworGgnidnel dlohesuoh weN
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in a second step, the sample period is reduced, excluding the years 2014 and 2015. in 
light of the arguments outlined in section 3, it is expected that the reduced sample period 
should give more clear results. again, the specifications outlined previously were estimated, 
along with variants that included or excluded bank- and country-specific variables. the 
results shown in tables 5 and 6 resemble those in tables 3 and 4, despite the reduced 
sample period.
these results are consistent regardless of the choice of dependent variable: growth in 
lending or new lending flows as a ratio of total loans. sensitivity analysis is carried out 
using three bank-specific variables, representing capital and funding constraints that 
banks might face: the loan-to-deposit ratio, the leverage ratio, and the tier 1 capital ratio, 
as well as two structural variables that capture the ease of resolving Npls in a specific 
country. these five variables are added, one at a time, to the specification reported in 
Table 3. 
NOTES: Columns present regression results in the same order as in Table 3. T-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parenthesis. *** = significance at the 
0.1% level, ** = significance at the 1% level, * = significance at the 5% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE FE AB RE FE AB
***3510.0-***7210.0-***1110.0-***3200.0-***7300.0-***2400.0-latipac/LPN
(-5.16) (-6.72) (-4.74) (-12.90) (-6.84) (-10.84)
*067.94**063.82514.0799.0508.1-215.0-stessA
(-0.95) (-0.83) (0.31) (1.52) (3.41) (2.24)
50-E44.250-E00.280-E57.750-E40.1-40-E62.260-E46.3PDG
(1.01) (1.42) (-0.60) (0.07) (0.71) (0.57)
866.1270.1-300.0-505.23-185.0925.3-AINOE
(-0.74) (0.09) (-1.43) (-0.00) (-0.11) (0.04)
069.0-*643.1-990.0101.0-450.0-390.0-epols dleiY
(-0.58) (-0.26) (-0.21) (0.63) (-2.42) (-1.03)
***084.1***111.1***181.1ymmud 2Q
(4.10) (4.37) (3.77)
**052.1245.0**727.0ymmud 4Q
(2.66) (1.89) (2.79)
791.0-gnidnel proc weN .L
(-1.10)
L. Growth in corp loans -0.025
(-0.59)
**001.531-997.0-571.9***884.8tnatsnoC
)91.3-()43.0-()58.0()05.3(
415256256715556556snoitavresbO
090.0910.0550.0050.0derauqs-R
906.0780.0tset nesnaH
025.0000.0tset nagraS
713.0062.0nesnaH-ni-ecnereffiD
kcots naol etaroproc ni htworGgnidnel etaroproc weN
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table 7 reports the outcome of this sensitivity analysis for corporate lending for the fixed 
effects estimator.13 it is notable that, in all of the considered regressions, bank capital and 
funding constraints, proxied by the tier 1 capital ratio, the leverage ratio, and the loan-to-
deposit ratio, are found to be statistically insignificant (see table 7). this may be attributed 
to the macro-financial conditions prevailing in the period covered by the data. capitalisation 
of significant institutions was found to be broadly sufficient in the 2014 ecb comprehensive 
Assessment, and nevertheless, the aggregate Tier 1 capital ratio continued to increase 
throughout the sample period, reaching 15.6% by end-2017. that implies a very sizeable 
buffer with respect to 10%, the approximate level of the ratio that banks are expected to 
hold, on average, by the ecb in its supervisory capacity. this high level of the ratio, and 
insignificance of the capital ratio in our regressions, may be an indication that capital 
constraints were far from binding for most of the banks in the sample, even if a small group 
of banks might have been close to the minimum requirements. similarly, and as discussed 
earlier, liquidity and funding constraints were relaxed by monetary policy measures; in 
13 table 7 provides a selection of these regression results. owing to space constraints, detailed sensitivity analysis 
using all of the considered bank controls and removing bank-specific controls altogether is available from the 
authors upon request.
NOTES: Columns present regression results in the same order as in Table 4. T-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parenthesis. *** = significance at the 
0.1% level, ** = significance at the 1% level, * = significance at the 5% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE FE AB RE FE AB
***5500.0-***3500.0-**7600.0-2000.0*7000.0-2100.0-latipac/LPN
(-1.72) (-2.53) (0.40) (-2.97) (-4.13) (-8.15)
***050.18**080.92711.0955.1-*456.2-*504.0-stessA
(-2.05) (-2.07) (-0.84) (0.43) (2.86) (4.16)
50-E78.150-E33.8-60-E94.1-50-E71.160-E39.3-*60-E18.1PDG
(2.09) (-0.36) (0.73) (-0.52) (-1.12) (0.78)
059.84-096.13-504.5-008.61225.1-967.0-AINOE
(-0.43) (-0.60) (1.38) (-0.72) (-1.70) (-0.95)
180.1-579.0-421.0-910.0-470.0261.0-epols dleiY
(-1.57) (0.72) (-0.14) (-0.71) (-1.85) (-1.02)
161.0840.0010.0ymmud 2Q
(0.07) (0.39) (0.74)
292.0-731.0-581.0-ymmud 4Q
(-0.89) (-0.82) (-0.66)
***880.0gnidnel hh weN .L
(5.82)
L. Growth in hh loans -0.046
(-1.69)
**000.411-777.0-*061.61***284.4tnatsnoC
)98.2()92.0()81.2()04.3(
415256256715556556snoitavresbO
040.0100.0210.0400.0derauqs-R
746.0826.0tset nesnaH
710.0100.0tset nagraS
355.0476.0nesnaH-ni-ecnereffiD
kcots naol dlohesuoh ni htworGgnidnel dlohesuoh weN
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particular through targeted, long-term refinancing operations and full allotment in regular 
policy operations. at the same time, it is reassuring that the coefficients estimated for the 
capital/Npl variable seem stable across these additional specifications.
at this juncture, it is appropriate to comment on the validity of the interest rates included 
as country-specific explanatory variables. the period included in the sample used here 
covers a period of extraordinary monetary policy accommodation by the european central 
bank, which heavily impacted the eoNia rate, through full-allotment credit operations and 
a zero interest rate since 2016, and sovereign yields, through various asset purchase 
programmes. it is, therefore, perhaps to be expected that these variables have little 
explanatory power during this period, as the cost and quantity of funding may not have 
been a binding constraint for the vast majority of euro area banks.
this paper analysed the relationship between bank asset quality and lending, providing 
evidence that, for large euro area banks, this relationship was in line with expectations 
during the economic recovery which developed between 2014 and 2018. this confirms 
that, in periods when loan demand is strong and improving, and banks are not facing 
5 Conclusions
NOTES: T-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parenthesis. *** = significance at the 0.1% level, ** = significance at the 1% level, * = significance at the 
5% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
NPL ratio -0.0031*** -0.0039*** -0.0038*** -0.0037*** -0.0037*  -0.0141*** -0.0102** -0.0104** -0.0103** -0.0128**
(-4.70) (-4.81) (-4.75) (-4.83) (-2.38) (-10.36) (-2.80) (-2.88) (-2.86) (-3.31)
Assets -3.377 -2.794 -2.616 -2.597 -2.574 34.740** 15.900* 15.610* 15.620* 14.950*
(-1.38) (-1.29) (-1.24) (-1.23) (-1.23) (3.37) (2.21) (2.18) (2.18) (2.13)
GDP 1.67E-05 2.07E-05 2.14E-05 1.95E-05 2.17E-05 -9.95E-06 2.33E-06 3.90E-07 3.54E-07 1.21E-06
(0.93) (1.85) (1.90) (1.77) (1.90) (-0.31) (0.15) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08)
EONIA -64.950** 6.252* 6.206* 5.600 6.326 -9.839 0.462 0.380 0.330 -0.809
(-2.84) (2.05) (2.03) (1.85) (1.84) (-0.20) (0.16) (0.13) (0.11) (0.28)
Yield slope -1.181 -0.125 -0.077 -0.051 -0.080 -0.353 -0.638 -0.695 -0.697 -0.738
(-1.55) (-0.74) (-0.47) (-0.32) (-0.49) (-0.51) (-1.58) (-1.66) (-1.66) (-1.77)
Q2 dummy 1.243*** 1.227*** 1.219*** 1.228*** 1.217*** 0.811 0.053 0.074 0.072 0.056
(4.18) (5.16) (5.13) (5.12) (5.17) (1.03) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10)
Q4 dummy 0.835* 1.347 1.357 1.372 1.350* 1.587 0.771 0.764 0.764 0.834
(2.59) (1.95) (1.95) (1.96) (2.00) (1.75) (1.04) (1.03) (1.03) (1.10)
200.0 100.0RCL
)86.0( )56.0(
600.0oitar D-t-L 010.0- 
(0.83) )82.1-( 
900.0- 600.0-etar yrevoceR
)74.0-( )14.0-(
800.0- 140.0-ycnevlosni gnivloseR
)92.0-( )75.1-(
882.0-610.0oitar 1reiT
)26.1-((0.12)
Constant -3.365 15.640 15.690 18.840 14.690 -160.300*** -71.560* -69.870* -70.040* -63.490
(-0.24) (1.53) (1.59) (1.91) (1.40) (-3.53) (-2.10) (-2.03) (-2.03) (-1.93)
Observations 493 897 897 897 897 492 889 889 889 889
R-squared 0.099 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.099 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.047
Growth in household loan stockNew corporate lending
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regulatory capital and liquidity constraints, the presence of high Npl stocks may hinder 
individual banks’ lending. this is even more relevant when Npls are not only high in 
absolute terms, but also high in comparison to the available loss-absorbing capital. this 
finding could be associated with risk perceptions and appetite. high realised credit risk 
may influence individual banks’ assessment of future credit risk, as partly prompted by 
existing bank regulation. the nature of that mechanism would require further study, taking 
into account, in particular, risk profiles and pricing behaviour of individual banks.
this paper, being focused on bank-specific data, does not attempt to quantify the 
aggregate credit supply effect of elevated Npl stocks; to the extent that strong banks are 
present in the credit market, or new entrants are willing to step in, a reduction of credit 
supply by weaker banks may not necessarily lead to credit crunches. that being said, in 
the context of the euro area, where cross-border banking shrank significantly during the 
financial crisis, and many national banking markets are dominated by a small number of 
domestically-focused banks that all face similar asset quality issues, the presence of such 
non-trivial aggregate effects appears likely. further analysis in that direction would be 
welcome.
from a macroeconomic and policy perspective, our findings support the view that high 
Npl stocks should be decisively resolved. When banks are burdened with high Npls, 
adequate capitalisation and more resilient funding in the banking sector may not be 
sufficient to restore loan growth. once Npls stocks have been accumulated, it cannot be 
expected that monetary or macroprudential policy can address them. policies that target 
Npl stocks directly are needed. in addition to supervisory action, such policies should 
include structural reforms that speed up enforcement of loan collateral and insolvency 
proceedings, or facilitate Npl disposals to non-bank investors. Well-designed asset 
management companies, which can be set up to carve out Npls from going-concern 
banks, could also contribute to a swift reduction in NPL stocks [see Fell et al. (2017) and 
Balgova et al. (2018)].
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